Letter from Mark Mercer (President of the Society for Academic Freedom and Scholarship) to Michael J. Mahon (President of the University of Lethbridge)
I like this fellow, named Mark Mercer. Someone named Ed Seaward wrote a fine biography of MARK (which I constantly misspell as MARC below), pointing out his adherence to the Analytic philosophical tradition and his “accidental activism” in favour of freedom of expression and academic freedom, as opposed to Social Justice or “woke” activism. [http://www.edseaward.com/2021/06/09/mark-mercer-passionately-dispassionate/]
But the interesting thing about those who oppose “wokeness” and/or “cancel culture” — they have, in very many cases, bought into the ideas and doctrines, which inevitably led to such cultures and behaviours. Incidentally, Mark’s letter, above, is arguably irrefutable. Not so his thinking as I will argue below. Away we go!
Cancel culture is not a new phenomenon in academia, even before Plato’s Academy. Socrates was falsely accused of the “big sins” of his day and time [corrupting youth and atheism], before Plato founded the 1st Academy. He was permanently cancelled with hemlock. Same charge against Aristotle — same town/polis at Athens, after the Academy was founded. Boethius got cancelled near the end of the Roman Empire, as the last of the Roman philosophers and so-called first of the scholastic philosophers. After the medievals brought back the ancients and invented Universities, which resulted in the Renaissance, Galileo was accused of heresy by the same kinds of “scholars” as the poet, Meletus, and the orator, Lycon, in Socrates’ case. So, too, with Giordano Bruno (although Galileo was smart enough in theology not to get convicted of heresy and burned). Then, on to modern times.
In still “relatively Puritan” America, Bertrand Russell was “cancelled” from teaching mathematics and logic because of his views on divorce and “free love”! Uncle Bertie is amusing (He is the “Knowledge is justified true belief” proponent). Russell once told a theist with whom he was rationally debating God’s existence that he would, in effect: “Tell God that god had not given him enough information to decide the theistic question!” — if and only if theism was true and he actually met God! (Russell was one of the very few fellas that would consider “talking down” to God as a rational activity — after being found guilty of being wrong — if and only if he was wrong. Another digression.) Today’s big “sins” are racism and promoting hatred. So that is what Frances is accused of being and doing by the same sorts of “poets” who went after Socrates or scholars who hated Galileo for proving them wrong. To the point of “little errors in the beginning” (that lead to academic cancellations):
Frances Widdowson recommends James Lindsay’s co-authored book Cynical Theories, from which she obtains the expression “reified post-modernism” as the phenomenon responsible for wokeism and cancel culture. Lindsay and his co-author point out 2 principles and 4 themes of post-modernism in their book on Cynical Theories. Quote
(LINDSAY): THE POSTMODERN PRINCIPLES AND THEMES IN APPLICATION
Despite mutating to become actionable for identity politics, applied postmodernism has retained the two postmodern principles at its core.
1. The postmodern knowledge principle: Radical skepticism about whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism.
This denial of objective knowledge or truth and commitment to cultural constructivism, and belief that whatever it is we call truth is nothing more than a construct of the culture calling it that, has been largely retained (snip)…
2. The postmodern political principle: A belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies, which decide what can be known and how. [endquote]
So those are the 2 principles of reified post-modernism. The 4 themes which James subsequently elucidates feature an absurd modernist idea of what “theory/ies” mean, contrary to actual scientific theories. Scientific theories begin with observations of nature, followed by hypotheses (as attempts to explain the causes of observations), followed by repeated and repetitive tests and further observations, further hypotheses and testing, further observations and tests, etc. etc. — until a testable theory (repetitively confirmed set of hypotheses and tests) is formulated. But the modernists start with a misnamed “theory” [Critical Race Theory; Queer Theory; Gender Fluid Theory] and then look for support/s. Backwards.
Lindsay seems to accept the modernist/post-modernist idea of “theory” in discussing the 4 themes of reified post-modernism, although he pointed out he would do so in the introduction, quote:
1. The Blurring of Boundaries
This theme is most evident in postcolonial and queer Theories … (snip) … a personal interpretation of lived experience (often informed—or misinformed—by Theory) is elevated to the status of evidence (usually of Theory)
2. The Power of Language
The power and danger of language are foregrounded in all the newer applied postmodern Theories (snip)
3. Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism is, of course, most pronounced in postcolonial Theory, but (snip) …
4. The Loss of the Individual and the Universal
(snip) … Applied postmodern Theory tends to regard mainstream liberalism as complacent, naive, (snip) …
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE SCHOLARSHIP
… (snip) … Theorists of the 1980s and 1990s made postmodernism applicable to institutions and politics…”
[First Chapter of Cynical Theories from around page 29 in my Adobe Reader]
I quoted just enough of Lindsay’s points on “themes” to note his use of “theory” in explaining post modernism which he mentions as being hard to define. Now, check out Widdowson’s interview with Mark Mercer early on in her Rational Space Disputations. It was her 2nd so-called “disputation”. Mark is strong in his apparent adherence to Lindsay’s first Principle of post-modernism and weak on the 2nd principle, although he has a very mild quasi-adherence to the 2nd principle. Quote:
MERCER: [Time 4:07]: Maybe Frances and I would talk a little bit about science and the philosophy of science. I think our views differ there. I am anti-foundationalist and quite SCEPTICAL about things. Frances has a keener sense about the robust goodness of science than I do. [4:26] …
WIDDOWSON: [Time 35:50 approx.]: I believe you are … you do not accept the DEFINITION of knowledge as being justified true belief? Is that correct?
MERCER: [Time 36:11] Ah Well uh, to be really esoteric about it. I think definition is absolutely the wrong. I don’t care about that. Definitions are about how words are used. Uh, but yes. Some would say that uh, um, If Sally knows that P, then Sally has a … then Sally is well justified in believing that P. And P is true. Right. Um Now I accept that. I think If one knows that P, then P is true, one believes that P and one has a very good justification for believing that P. Alright. All the evidence favours P. No evidence is against P. All of that.
***(Marc’s reference to “P”, above, signifies the first in a series of modern logical symbols (p, q, r, s, t etc.) standing for any distinct proposition of a so-called “atomic” variety. “P” symbolizes a proposition which has NOT been split up into subjects and predicates, as is the case with Aristotelian Syllogistic (Logic), where Subjects and Predicates are the simplest symbolized parts of propositions and of sulLOGISmos (logic; reasoning). So all the references to believing, knowing etc. “P” signify that Mark apparently accepts knowledge as justified true belief. You can actually see a photograph of Mark making the above argument in one of his philosophy classes in Seaward’s article on Mark. BUT then … K.B.)***
MERCER: Um I don’t think that we’re ever in a position to judge whether someone actually knows something. Um. I mean this would; this is what knowledge would be. Is there any knowledge? I’m not sure there is. I think there (Francis interrupts below) …
[RECALL LINDSAY: 1. The postmodern knowledge principle: Radical skepticism about whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism. K.B.]
FRANCES: Um, Well I would [37:06] I would argue that knowledge is the kind of best guess. [End Quote]
Thus we have Marc’s apparent commitment to the post modern principle of (lack of) knowledge. But he waffles because earlier he had said, quote:
MERCER: [Time 32:10]… it’s not a triumph of university teaching if students come out knowing more than when they went in. In the sense of KNOWING, [IS K.B.] having JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEFS about the thing. The goal is just the endeavor itself. Right. Ah, So anyway that’s my view of the academic mission — individually with colleagues with students. [Time 32:40]
COMMENTS: Marc doesn’t really have “a commitment to cultural constructivism”, as far as the first post-modern principle (of James Lindsay) is concerned, but seems in full agreement with skepticism about knowledge. But he does have something very similar to “cultural constructivism” which he calls “the endeavor itself” above. It is the academic “culture” itself which he describes as “living the life of the mind” with “colleagues (and) with students”, per above. This “living the life of the mind” is what he enjoys doing and doing in company with others. In short, that could be called “academic culture”. To be certain:
MERCER [Time: 26:40] First of all, what is that we’re doing as academics? … (snip).. [27:39] We get together and do this because we enjoy it. Because we like it. And we find ahm that doing it in company; doing it with people, is a lot of fun too. And not only that it helps us because others can criticize us can expand on ideas, offer alternatives. Uh, the job of trying to think things through; trying to understand them; goes much better in community. So you take the students. The students are aspiring intellectuals. They aspire to have moral and intellectual autonomy. Or at least that’s the assumption. Um, if they don’t enjoy it, they’re always free to leave. And at least they’ve had a sample of it. So very few people have. I think, you know, it would be better if more people were brought together in an intellectual community to try to live the life of the mind. And find out whether they like it. [28:42] So what we’re doing as academics is LIVING THE LIFE OF THE MIND. And what we’re doing as teachers-as-academics, as classroom instructors, are inviting our students also to enjoy the life of the mind. We want to understand how things are, that’s for sure. But we also enjoy the process of coming to understand how things are. But that itself, the process, is an object of inquiry. Right. We can disagree with each other about what is the process. Or what are the best processes of coming to understand how things are. So I mean in a sense there is no firm ground. There’s nowhere, we can all put our feet down and say, you know: This is where we are and let’s begin from there. [29:26]
Mercer is not buying into Lindsay’s 2nd Principle’s “…postmodern political principle: A belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies [which decide what can be known and how.]” But he does seem to buy into the thesis that those “who live the life of the mind” discuss and debate [not Lindsay’s “decide”] what can be known (or not) and “how” (Mercer’s “processes of coming to understand” are “how”). But obviously Mercer is, once again, skeptical of deciding any “firm ground” for his “processes”. The “woke”, in sharp contrast, are certain that those in power illegitimately decide what is known and how it is known.
COMMENTARY: Socrates found that the “knowers” in his day and time [i.e. leading politicians, sophists (persons of accomplished wisdom; good connotation back then) and leading poets] were more defective in knowledge than the so-called “bystanders”, who listened to him questioning the “leading minds” of his day and time. But the craftsman (artisans), who were considered to not be “life of the mind” sorts of people, did teach him “many fine things” that he did not know. However they had the same defect as the politicians, sophists and poets. They thought that their limited knowledge or skill in one area, made them “expert knowers” in/of all things. So Socrates preferred to be content with knowing a few things [e.g. The Greek language, arithmetic and geometry, which he taught to Meno’s ploughboy/slave, etc.], that many others also knew, but, more importantly for him, also knowing when he was ignorant of other things. People make “fusses” to the effect that Socrates was “wise” because he “knew that he knew nothing”, which is non-sense. That error is from the end of the first book of Plato’s Republic where Socrates tells Thrasymachus, quote:
SOCRATES: “So that for me the present outcome of this discussion is that I KNOW NOTHING. [Those who think/say that Socrates was a “know nothing” seemed to have quit reading here. But Socrates continues … K.B.] For if I don’t know what THE JUST is [i.e The definition of “the just” KB], I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy [Plato; Republic, 354b end of Book I]
Socrates is seeking a definition of Justice. Recall, above, that Mark Mercer doesn’t like definitions [Requote:- “I think definition is absolutely the wrong. I don’t care about that. Definitions are about how words are used.”], whereas Aristotle points out that human beings only argue about 4 general things, to wit Genera [large classes] Definitions (a.k.a. species) Properties and (strict) Accidents. [The Topics; Book I, Ch. 4 and Ch. 5]. When Marc says that “Definitions are about how words are used.” he’s committing the “fallacy that turns upon names alone”, which is the first fallacy noted in The Sophistical Refutations. Things are not mere names. Justice isn’t a mere word, anymore than Socrates or Aristotle of ancient Athens and Stagira, respectively, were mere words. GRAMMAR is the art (As in the 7 liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy KB) of how words are used. Definitions are one of the 4 major TOPICS of philosophical discourse. Definitions tell us WHAT things are. If we don’t know WHAT various things are (Their definitions.) we don’t know anything else about them, according to Socrates and Aristotle.
ON TO THEORIES:
We see an instance of Lindsay’s 1. “blurring of boundaries”, with Marc, when he wants to allegedly “scientifically investigate” theories involving the supernatural. Quote [12:37] “But I wouldn’t rule out of science class, um, THEORIES that invoke the concept of the supernatural. Right. So, any objection one might have to including indigenous lore, in a science class, I think, can’t be that indigenous lore posits uh spiritual entities, posits spirit, uh supernatural things, posits final causes, or or something like that. That can’t be a ground for excluding it from science classes. [13:10]
COMMENT: Marc is using “theory” above as loosely and ambiguously as any post-modernist scholar. The “concept of the supernatural” belongs in a theology class — not a science class — although if you ask Thomas Aquinas, theology is a science, where the Divinity Itself has revealed its Principles. Agree or not with Aquinas and even Aristotle. No principle is a hypothesis, quote:
ARISTOTLE: … he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher, and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and NON-HYPOTHETICAL. For a PRINCIPLE which every one must have who understands anything that is, IS NOT A HYPOTHESIS; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; [Metaphysics; Bk. IV, Ch. 3. 1005b lines 9 – 20 ]
COMMENT (concluded) When I returned to university [B.Sc. in Medical Lab Science, 1971] in the late 1980’s I was told there were 3 “theories” of truth, all with valid criticisms/refutations [Correspondence “theory”; Coherence “theory”; and Pragmatic “theory”]. Ah Hah, I argued — You mean the Pontius Pilate “theory” of truth, which made me unpopular. This loose talk of “theories” was the “little logical error” in the beginning which inevitably resulted in all the post-modernist sorts of so-called “theories”, which are nothing better than wild speculations, because theories are actually repetitively tested and confirmed hypotheses. But one does hypothesis testing with the principle of “contradiction” [some say “law of non-contradiction”] as stated by Aristotle above — a principle which is NOT HYPOTHETICAL, hence NON-THEORETICAL. But Marc, who bought into that version of “theory” [relating to logic] has a modernist, if not post-modernist, view of THEORIES, quote
MERCER: [14:27] Ahm creatures breed true according to their type. And the type is the genera. Um you know and so here we have, here we have this thesis. A well … a large scale THEORY, well. Go out into the world and attempt to find instances that would refute that theory. Ahm And ahm [14:47] THIS IS THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. To take the hypothesis; to ahm generate testable conditions. Go in and create conditions where you can test the implications of the THEORY for observation. [15:07]
COMMENT: Marc’s got it all backwards. First is observation. Then hypothesis. Then experimental test of an hypothesis. Multiple tests and confirmations of an hypothesis and corollary hypotheses, generate/s a THEORY/ies. But Mercer starts with a THEORY and his fictional scientist then goes off to look for refutations of his or her theory. But that’s not the way it usually goes — somebody else, in most cases, finds the refuting counter-example to a leading scientist’s pet theory — just as Frances Widdowson and Hymie Rubenstein (? spelling) are adducing “counters” to the indigenous theses/theories of “genocide”. Notice he says, at this point in the alleged “disputation” that requote “this is the method of science”. But …
MERCER [Time 5:27]: … I don’t think there is, really, ahm, such a thing as THE METHOD OF SCIENCE and I don’t think that um ah — so I’m thinking of ways in which I believe I differ from you in our understanding or appreciation of science.
Thus Mark contradicts himself between 5:27 and 14:47, which is the method of both philosophy and of science. Philosophers look for verbal contradictions. Scientists look for existential opposites. In Aristotle’s phraseology CONTRARIES are the subjects of the same SCIENCES. Physicians look at the contraries of health and sickness. Arithmeticians consider even vs. odd numbers and rational vs. irrational numbers. Geometers consider curvilinear and rectilinear “lines” and/or objects and irrational numbers such as “pi” when one attempts to obtain a ratio between a curvilinear (circle) and a rectilinear (diameter of same circle) line. Physicists consider the contrary qualities of water as solid (ice) liquid (the usual state of water) and vapour (steam). Cosmologists consider Big Bangs vs. Big Crunches.
I have experience with applied science as a medical laboratory technologist. There IS a (scientific) METHOD BOOK for every sort of test we do on various types of samples [usually blood, urine, tissues and/or feces]. Hundreds of Methods for thousands of tests, with some overriding general means of analysis — e.g. gravimetric (weighing), colorimetric (spectroscopic; both emission and absorption spectra for different substances) microscopic, genetic, bacteriological, viral, chromatographic, antigenic/antibody, enzymatic, etc. analytical methods. They are all practical applications of SPECULATIVE THEORIES developed by means of the SCIENTIFIC METHOD. Thus, from theories, we get applied or practical science analyses — everyone with a strict METHOD, along with built in standards and quality controls. Marc doesn’t know very much about science either speculative; a.k.a. theoretical; or applied; a.k.a. practical. Then, of course, there is productive science — anything from atom bombs to antibiotics.
Thus the 3 functions of the actual “life of the mind” — speculation/theory, practice and production. Every human being in existence, now, or there ever was, exhibits such “life of the mind” functions as intellectual animals. Renaissance types exhibit all 3 intellectual functions. Most people, such as Socrates’ artisans/craftsmen, mostly know how to make things and/or do drudgery sorts of things, like primitive farming or assembly line work. But somebody “thought about” that work before inventing it and, then, perfecting or varying the work by imitating or improving it. Back to Marc’s thoughts on theories.
MARC [Time 17:15]: I mean we’re never really testing a THEORY against the world. We’re testing the THEORY by looking at the world against other THEORIES other ways of thinking. [17:25] [So theories seem to be “other ways of thinking” at this point. Perhaps Indigenous ways of thinking/knowing??? But… K.B.]
MARC MERCER [Time 20:48]: Phenomena such as plate tectonics. You know I was a school student in the 1960’s when plate tectonics was all the rage. And one of my science teachers was you know just really keen about this. Um Wonderful and you think that this was just 60 years ago. Right, so the um understanding of the earth and physical processes on the earth was revolutionized only 60 years ago. And um what this has opened up, ya know, by way of understanding the world is immense. Geologists 65 years ago knew much much less than geologists 60 years ago did. Just because of this one very broad engrossing THEORY that related phenomena that seemed to be disparate and gave an explanation. Uh ya, so I mean this is progress. If one wants to understand HOW THE WORLD IS; how THE WORLD WORKS; the forces that are responsible for mountain building and oceans and all the rest. Well great progress has been made. Yes. [22:04]
COMMENT: Thus, arguably, plate tectonics is a THEORY which explains the WORLD — at least many phenomena thereof. One might say that this theory, at least, was tested against the world. So, at best, Dr. Mercer is ambiguous about THEORIES in relation to the world. But he has the same vagueness with respect to theory as Lindsay points out when mentioning post-modernists. Quote
MERCER [10:41] But nothing is ever that totally closed. If someone appears and presents a THEORY and that THEORY involves appeal to entities that we’re happy to describe as supernatural — well, again if we want to show that it’s false we have to investigate IT. That particular THEORY. I mean if we’re being scientific. We don’t have to do it. We don’t have to do anything. We can say; Oh it involves spirits so I’m not going to pay attention to it. I got better things to do. Uh … But if we want to engage it. We have to engage it um in its own terms. Try to discover what um observable consequences would follow were the THEORY true. Bring about the initial conditions … See if those … those consequences follow. If they don’t, then we have reason for thinking that there is something wrong with the THEORY somewhere. [11:35]
For the other remarks of Lindsay on Theory, in relation to Marc we have:
“2. The Power of Language. The power and danger of language are foregrounded in all the newer applied postmodern Theories (snip).” Marc is the opposite, he plays down language.
As to “3. Cultural Relativism (Cultural relativism is, of course, most pronounced in postcolonial Theory, but (snip) …), mark likes the Academic “life of the mind” controversial culture, but not class controversies.
Finally, with respect to Lindsay’s “4. The Loss of the Individual and the Universal (snip) … Applied postmodern Theory tends to regard mainstream liberalism as complacent, naive, (snip) … “, Marc, well to the CONTRARY, as per his letter, upholds the individual [Widdowson], but is arguably a naive “small-L” liberal.
In sum Mark’s skepticism of knowledge and his looseness on the definition of actual theories, which is typical of the Analytical tradition, opens the Academic door utterly wide for the “cynical theories” of modern class struggle Marxists, who have simply changed the names of oppressors and oppressed. Instead of capitalists exploiting and oppressing workers, we have White, Patriarchal, Males exploiting and oppressing Bipoc, Anarchical, opposite-gender and/or gender-fluid folks. After all, it’s a theory and who is to say whether (or not) such class struggle theories are true or false???
MARK: Um I don’t think that we’re ever in a position to judge whether someone actually knows something. [36:55] MY FINAL COMMENT: When one is in no “position to judge”, then one is in no position to either condemn or deny another person’s beliefs or bogus “theories”.
I like this fellow, named Mark Mercer. Someone named Ed Seaward wrote a fine biography of MARK (which I constantly misspell as MARC below), pointing out his adherence to the Analytic philosophical tradition and his “accidental activism” in favour of freedom of expression and academic freedom, as opposed to Social Justice or “woke” activism. [http://www.edseaward.com/2021/06/09/mark-mercer-passionately-dispassionate/]
But the interesting thing about those who oppose “wokeness” and/or “cancel culture” — they have, in very many cases, bought into the ideas and doctrines, which inevitably led to such cultures and behaviours. Incidentally, Mark’s letter, above, is arguably irrefutable. Not so his thinking as I will argue below. Away we go!
Cancel culture is not a new phenomenon in academia, even before Plato’s Academy. Socrates was falsely accused of the “big sins” of his day and time [corrupting youth and atheism], before Plato founded the 1st Academy. He was permanently cancelled with hemlock. Same charge against Aristotle — same town/polis at Athens, after the Academy was founded. Boethius got cancelled near the end of the Roman Empire, as the last of the Roman philosophers and so-called first of the scholastic philosophers. After the medievals brought back the ancients and invented Universities, which resulted in the Renaissance, Galileo was accused of heresy by the same kinds of “scholars” as the poet, Meletus, and the orator, Lycon, in Socrates’ case. So, too, with Giordano Bruno (although Galileo was smart enough in theology not to get convicted of heresy and burned). Then, on to modern times.
In still “relatively Puritan” America, Bertrand Russell was “cancelled” from teaching mathematics and logic because of his views on divorce and “free love”! Uncle Bertie is amusing (He is the “Knowledge is justified true belief” proponent). Russell once told a theist with whom he was rationally debating God’s existence that he would, in effect: “Tell God that god had not given him enough information to decide the theistic question!” — if and only if theism was true and he actually met God! (Russell was one of the very few fellas that would consider “talking down” to God as a rational activity — after being found guilty of being wrong — if and only if he was wrong. Another digression.) Today’s big “sins” are racism and promoting hatred. So that is what Frances is accused of being and doing by the same sorts of “poets” who went after Socrates or scholars who hated Galileo for proving them wrong. To the point of “little errors in the beginning” (that lead to academic cancellations):
Frances Widdowson recommends James Lindsay’s co-authored book Cynical Theories, from which she obtains the expression “reified post-modernism” as the phenomenon responsible for wokeism and cancel culture. Lindsay and his co-author point out 2 principles and 4 themes of post-modernism in their book on Cynical Theories. Quote
(LINDSAY): THE POSTMODERN PRINCIPLES AND THEMES IN APPLICATION
Despite mutating to become actionable for identity politics, applied postmodernism has retained the two postmodern principles at its core.
1. The postmodern knowledge principle: Radical skepticism about whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism.
This denial of objective knowledge or truth and commitment to cultural constructivism, and belief that whatever it is we call truth is nothing more than a construct of the culture calling it that, has been largely retained (snip)…
2. The postmodern political principle: A belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies, which decide what can be known and how. [endquote]
So those are the 2 principles of reified post-modernism. The 4 themes which James subsequently elucidates feature an absurd modernist idea of what “theory/ies” mean, contrary to actual scientific theories. Scientific theories begin with observations of nature, followed by hypotheses (as attempts to explain the causes of observations), followed by repeated and repetitive tests and further observations, further hypotheses and testing, further observations and tests, etc. etc. — until a testable theory (repetitively confirmed set of hypotheses and tests) is formulated. But the modernists start with a misnamed “theory” [Critical Race Theory; Queer Theory; Gender Fluid Theory] and then look for support/s. Backwards.
Lindsay seems to accept the modernist/post-modernist idea of “theory” in discussing the 4 themes of reified post-modernism, although he pointed out he would do so in the introduction, quote:
1. The Blurring of Boundaries
This theme is most evident in postcolonial and queer Theories … (snip) … a personal interpretation of lived experience (often informed—or misinformed—by Theory) is elevated to the status of evidence (usually of Theory)
2. The Power of Language
The power and danger of language are foregrounded in all the newer applied postmodern Theories (snip)
3. Cultural Relativism
Cultural relativism is, of course, most pronounced in postcolonial Theory, but (snip) …
4. The Loss of the Individual and the Universal
(snip) … Applied postmodern Theory tends to regard mainstream liberalism as complacent, naive, (snip) …
THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL JUSTICE SCHOLARSHIP
… (snip) … Theorists of the 1980s and 1990s made postmodernism applicable to institutions and politics…”
[First Chapter of Cynical Theories from around page 29 in my Adobe Reader]
I quoted just enough of Lindsay’s points on “themes” to note his use of “theory” in explaining post modernism which he mentions as being hard to define. Now, check out Widdowson’s interview with Mark Mercer early on in her Rational Space Disputations. It was her 2nd so-called “disputation”. Mark is strong in his apparent adherence to Lindsay’s first Principle of post-modernism and weak on the 2nd principle, although he has a very mild quasi-adherence to the 2nd principle. Quote:
MERCER: [Time 4:07]: Maybe Frances and I would talk a little bit about science and the philosophy of science. I think our views differ there. I am anti-foundationalist and quite SCEPTICAL about things. Frances has a keener sense about the robust goodness of science than I do. [4:26] …
WIDDOWSON: [Time 35:50 approx.]: I believe you are … you do not accept the DEFINITION of knowledge as being justified true belief? Is that correct?
MERCER: [Time 36:11] Ah Well uh, to be really esoteric about it. I think definition is absolutely the wrong. I don’t care about that. Definitions are about how words are used. Uh, but yes. Some would say that uh, um, If Sally knows that P, then Sally has a … then Sally is well justified in believing that P. And P is true. Right. Um Now I accept that. I think If one knows that P, then P is true, one believes that P and one has a very good justification for believing that P. Alright. All the evidence favours P. No evidence is against P. All of that.
***(Marc’s reference to “P”, above, signifies the first in a series of modern logical symbols (p, q, r, s, t etc.) standing for any distinct proposition of a so-called “atomic” variety. “P” symbolizes a proposition which has NOT been split up into subjects and predicates, as is the case with Aristotelian Syllogistic (Logic), where Subjects and Predicates are the simplest symbolized parts of propositions and of sulLOGISmos (logic; reasoning). So all the references to believing, knowing etc. “P” signify that Mark apparently accepts knowledge as justified true belief. You can actually see a photograph of Mark making the above argument in one of his philosophy classes in Seaward’s article on Mark. BUT then … K.B.)***
MERCER: Um I don’t think that we’re ever in a position to judge whether someone actually knows something. Um. I mean this would; this is what knowledge would be. Is there any knowledge? I’m not sure there is. I think there (Francis interrupts below) …
[RECALL LINDSAY: 1. The postmodern knowledge principle: Radical skepticism about whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism. K.B.]
FRANCES: Um, Well I would [37:06] I would argue that knowledge is the kind of best guess. [End Quote]
Thus we have Marc’s apparent commitment to the post modern principle of (lack of) knowledge. But he waffles because earlier he had said, quote:
MERCER: [Time 32:10]… it’s not a triumph of university teaching if students come out knowing more than when they went in. In the sense of KNOWING, [IS K.B.] having JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEFS about the thing. The goal is just the endeavor itself. Right. Ah, So anyway that’s my view of the academic mission — individually with colleagues with students. [Time 32:40]
COMMENTS: Marc doesn’t really have “a commitment to cultural constructivism”, as far as the first post-modern principle (of James Lindsay) is concerned, but seems in full agreement with skepticism about knowledge. But he does have something very similar to “cultural constructivism” which he calls “the endeavor itself” above. It is the academic “culture” itself which he describes as “living the life of the mind” with “colleagues (and) with students”, per above. This “living the life of the mind” is what he enjoys doing and doing in company with others. In short, that could be called “academic culture”. To be certain:
MERCER [Time: 26:40] First of all, what is that we’re doing as academics? … (snip).. [27:39] We get together and do this because we enjoy it. Because we like it. And we find ahm that doing it in company; doing it with people, is a lot of fun too. And not only that it helps us because others can criticize us can expand on ideas, offer alternatives. Uh, the job of trying to think things through; trying to understand them; goes much better in community. So you take the students. The students are aspiring intellectuals. They aspire to have moral and intellectual autonomy. Or at least that’s the assumption. Um, if they don’t enjoy it, they’re always free to leave. And at least they’ve had a sample of it. So very few people have. I think, you know, it would be better if more people were brought together in an intellectual community to try to live the life of the mind. And find out whether they like it. [28:42] So what we’re doing as academics is LIVING THE LIFE OF THE MIND. And what we’re doing as teachers-as-academics, as classroom instructors, are inviting our students also to enjoy the life of the mind. We want to understand how things are, that’s for sure. But we also enjoy the process of coming to understand how things are. But that itself, the process, is an object of inquiry. Right. We can disagree with each other about what is the process. Or what are the best processes of coming to understand how things are. So I mean in a sense there is no firm ground. There’s nowhere, we can all put our feet down and say, you know: This is where we are and let’s begin from there. [29:26]
Mercer is not buying into Lindsay’s 2nd Principle’s “…postmodern political principle: A belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies [which decide what can be known and how.]” But he does seem to buy into the thesis that those “who live the life of the mind” discuss and debate [not Lindsay’s “decide”] what can be known (or not) and “how” (Mercer’s “processes of coming to understand” are “how”). But obviously Mercer is, once again, skeptical of deciding any “firm ground” for his “processes”. The “woke”, in sharp contrast, are certain that those in power illegitimately decide what is known and how it is known.
COMMENTARY: Socrates found that the “knowers” in his day and time [i.e. leading politicians, sophists (persons of accomplished wisdom; good connotation back then) and leading poets] were more defective in knowledge than the so-called “bystanders”, who listened to him questioning the “leading minds” of his day and time. But the craftsman (artisans), who were considered to not be “life of the mind” sorts of people, did teach him “many fine things” that he did not know. However they had the same defect as the politicians, sophists and poets. They thought that their limited knowledge or skill in one area, made them “expert knowers” in/of all things. So Socrates preferred to be content with knowing a few things [e.g. The Greek language, arithmetic and geometry, which he taught to Meno’s ploughboy/slave, etc.], that many others also knew, but, more importantly for him, also knowing when he was ignorant of other things. People make “fusses” to the effect that Socrates was “wise” because he “knew that he knew nothing”, which is non-sense. That error is from the end of the first book of Plato’s Republic where Socrates tells Thrasymachus, quote:
SOCRATES: “So that for me the present outcome of this discussion is that I KNOW NOTHING. [Those who think/say that Socrates was a “know nothing” seemed to have quit reading here. But Socrates continues … K.B.] For if I don’t know what THE JUST is [i.e The definition of “the just” KB], I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy [Plato; Republic, 354b end of Book I]
Socrates is seeking a definition of Justice. Recall, above, that Mark Mercer doesn’t like definitions [Requote:- “I think definition is absolutely the wrong. I don’t care about that. Definitions are about how words are used.”], whereas Aristotle points out that human beings only argue about 4 general things, to wit Genera [large classes] Definitions (a.k.a. species) Properties and (strict) Accidents. [The Topics; Book I, Ch. 4 and Ch. 5]. When Marc says that “Definitions are about how words are used.” he’s committing the “fallacy that turns upon names alone”, which is the first fallacy noted in The Sophistical Refutations. Things are not mere names. Justice isn’t a mere word, anymore than Socrates or Aristotle of ancient Athens and Stagira, respectively, were mere words. GRAMMAR is the art (As in the 7 liberal arts of grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy KB) of how words are used. Definitions are one of the 4 major TOPICS of philosophical discourse. Definitions tell us WHAT things are. If we don’t know WHAT various things are (Their definitions.) we don’t know anything else about them, according to Socrates and Aristotle.
ON TO THEORIES:
We see an instance of Lindsay’s 1. “blurring of boundaries”, with Marc, when he wants to allegedly “scientifically investigate” theories involving the supernatural. Quote [12:37] “But I wouldn’t rule out of science class, um, THEORIES that invoke the concept of the supernatural. Right. So, any objection one might have to including indigenous lore, in a science class, I think, can’t be that indigenous lore posits uh spiritual entities, posits spirit, uh supernatural things, posits final causes, or or something like that. That can’t be a ground for excluding it from science classes. [13:10]
COMMENT: Marc is using “theory” above as loosely and ambiguously as any post-modernist scholar. The “concept of the supernatural” belongs in a theology class — not a science class — although if you ask Thomas Aquinas, theology is a science, where the Divinity Itself has revealed its Principles. Agree or not with Aquinas and even Aristotle. No principle is a hypothesis, quote:
ARISTOTLE: … he whose subject is existing things qua existing must be able to state the most certain principles of all things. This is the philosopher, and the most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken; for such a principle must be both the best known (for all men may be mistaken about things which they do not know), and NON-HYPOTHETICAL. For a PRINCIPLE which every one must have who understands anything that is, IS NOT A HYPOTHESIS; and that which every one must know who knows anything, he must already have when he comes to a special study. Evidently then such a principle is the most certain of all; which principle this is, let us proceed to say. It is, that the same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect; [Metaphysics; Bk. IV, Ch. 3. 1005b lines 9 – 20 ]
COMMENT (concluded) When I returned to university [B.Sc. in Medical Lab Science, 1971] in the late 1980’s I was told there were 3 “theories” of truth, all with valid criticisms/refutations [Correspondence “theory”; Coherence “theory”; and Pragmatic “theory”]. Ah Hah, I argued — You mean the Pontius Pilate “theory” of truth, which made me unpopular. This loose talk of “theories” was the “little logical error” in the beginning which inevitably resulted in all the post-modernist sorts of so-called “theories”, which are nothing better than wild speculations, because theories are actually repetitively tested and confirmed hypotheses. But one does hypothesis testing with the principle of “contradiction” [some say “law of non-contradiction”] as stated by Aristotle above — a principle which is NOT HYPOTHETICAL, hence NON-THEORETICAL. But Marc, who bought into that version of “theory” [relating to logic] has a modernist, if not post-modernist, view of THEORIES, quote
MERCER: [14:27] Ahm creatures breed true according to their type. And the type is the genera. Um you know and so here we have, here we have this thesis. A well … a large scale THEORY, well. Go out into the world and attempt to find instances that would refute that theory. Ahm And ahm [14:47] THIS IS THE METHOD OF SCIENCE. To take the hypothesis; to ahm generate testable conditions. Go in and create conditions where you can test the implications of the THEORY for observation. [15:07]
COMMENT: Marc’s got it all backwards. First is observation. Then hypothesis. Then experimental test of an hypothesis. Multiple tests and confirmations of an hypothesis and corollary hypotheses, generate/s a THEORY/ies. But Mercer starts with a THEORY and his fictional scientist then goes off to look for refutations of his or her theory. But that’s not the way it usually goes — somebody else, in most cases, finds the refuting counter-example to a leading scientist’s pet theory — just as Frances Widdowson and Hymie Rubenstein (? spelling) are adducing “counters” to the indigenous theses/theories of “genocide”. Notice he says, at this point in the alleged “disputation” that requote “this is the method of science”. But …
MERCER [Time 5:27]: … I don’t think there is, really, ahm, such a thing as THE METHOD OF SCIENCE and I don’t think that um ah — so I’m thinking of ways in which I believe I differ from you in our understanding or appreciation of science.
Thus Mark contradicts himself between 5:27 and 14:47, which is the method of both philosophy and of science. Philosophers look for verbal contradictions. Scientists look for existential opposites. In Aristotle’s phraseology CONTRARIES are the subjects of the same SCIENCES. Physicians look at the contraries of health and sickness. Arithmeticians consider even vs. odd numbers and rational vs. irrational numbers. Geometers consider curvilinear and rectilinear “lines” and/or objects and irrational numbers such as “pi” when one attempts to obtain a ratio between a curvilinear (circle) and a rectilinear (diameter of same circle) line. Physicists consider the contrary qualities of water as solid (ice) liquid (the usual state of water) and vapour (steam). Cosmologists consider Big Bangs vs. Big Crunches.
I have experience with applied science as a medical laboratory technologist. There IS a (scientific) METHOD BOOK for every sort of test we do on various types of samples [usually blood, urine, tissues and/or feces]. Hundreds of Methods for thousands of tests, with some overriding general means of analysis — e.g. gravimetric (weighing), colorimetric (spectroscopic; both emission and absorption spectra for different substances) microscopic, genetic, bacteriological, viral, chromatographic, antigenic/antibody, enzymatic, etc. analytical methods. They are all practical applications of SPECULATIVE THEORIES developed by means of the SCIENTIFIC METHOD. Thus, from theories, we get applied or practical science analyses — everyone with a strict METHOD, along with built in standards and quality controls. Marc doesn’t know very much about science either speculative; a.k.a. theoretical; or applied; a.k.a. practical. Then, of course, there is productive science — anything from atom bombs to antibiotics.
Thus the 3 functions of the actual “life of the mind” — speculation/theory, practice and production. Every human being in existence, now, or there ever was, exhibits such “life of the mind” functions as intellectual animals. Renaissance types exhibit all 3 intellectual functions. Most people, such as Socrates’ artisans/craftsmen, mostly know how to make things and/or do drudgery sorts of things, like primitive farming or assembly line work. But somebody “thought about” that work before inventing it and, then, perfecting or varying the work by imitating or improving it. Back to Marc’s thoughts on theories.
MARC [Time 17:15]: I mean we’re never really testing a THEORY against the world. We’re testing the THEORY by looking at the world against other THEORIES other ways of thinking. [17:25] [So theories seem to be “other ways of thinking” at this point. Perhaps Indigenous ways of thinking/knowing??? But… K.B.]
MARC MERCER [Time 20:48]: Phenomena such as plate tectonics. You know I was a school student in the 1960’s when plate tectonics was all the rage. And one of my science teachers was you know just really keen about this. Um Wonderful and you think that this was just 60 years ago. Right, so the um understanding of the earth and physical processes on the earth was revolutionized only 60 years ago. And um what this has opened up, ya know, by way of understanding the world is immense. Geologists 65 years ago knew much much less than geologists 60 years ago did. Just because of this one very broad engrossing THEORY that related phenomena that seemed to be disparate and gave an explanation. Uh ya, so I mean this is progress. If one wants to understand HOW THE WORLD IS; how THE WORLD WORKS; the forces that are responsible for mountain building and oceans and all the rest. Well great progress has been made. Yes. [22:04]
COMMENT: Thus, arguably, plate tectonics is a THEORY which explains the WORLD — at least many phenomena thereof. One might say that this theory, at least, was tested against the world. So, at best, Dr. Mercer is ambiguous about THEORIES in relation to the world. But he has the same vagueness with respect to theory as Lindsay points out when mentioning post-modernists. Quote
MERCER [10:41] But nothing is ever that totally closed. If someone appears and presents a THEORY and that THEORY involves appeal to entities that we’re happy to describe as supernatural — well, again if we want to show that it’s false we have to investigate IT. That particular THEORY. I mean if we’re being scientific. We don’t have to do it. We don’t have to do anything. We can say; Oh it involves spirits so I’m not going to pay attention to it. I got better things to do. Uh … But if we want to engage it. We have to engage it um in its own terms. Try to discover what um observable consequences would follow were the THEORY true. Bring about the initial conditions … See if those … those consequences follow. If they don’t, then we have reason for thinking that there is something wrong with the THEORY somewhere. [11:35]
For the other remarks of Lindsay on Theory, in relation to Marc we have:
“2. The Power of Language. The power and danger of language are foregrounded in all the newer applied postmodern Theories (snip).” Marc is the opposite, he plays down language.
As to “3. Cultural Relativism (Cultural relativism is, of course, most pronounced in postcolonial Theory, but (snip) …), mark likes the Academic “life of the mind” controversial culture, but not class controversies.
Finally, with respect to Lindsay’s “4. The Loss of the Individual and the Universal (snip) … Applied postmodern Theory tends to regard mainstream liberalism as complacent, naive, (snip) … “, Marc, well to the CONTRARY, as per his letter, upholds the individual [Widdowson], but is arguably a naive “small-L” liberal.
In sum Mark’s skepticism of knowledge and his looseness on the definition of actual theories, which is typical of the Analytical tradition, opens the Academic door utterly wide for the “cynical theories” of modern class struggle Marxists, who have simply changed the names of oppressors and oppressed. Instead of capitalists exploiting and oppressing workers, we have White, Patriarchal, Males exploiting and oppressing Bipoc, Anarchical, opposite-gender and/or gender-fluid folks. After all, it’s a theory and who is to say whether (or not) such class struggle theories are true or false???
MARK: Um I don’t think that we’re ever in a position to judge whether someone actually knows something. [36:55] MY FINAL COMMENT: When one is in no “position to judge”, then one is in no position to either condemn or deny another person’s beliefs or bogus “theories”.
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